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 During the apartheid era of South Africa, the nation came under siege from grassroots 
and international social organizations for its oppressive policies of discrimination. South Africa 
was engaging in blatant human rights violations; its racist policies restricted the freedoms of non-
whites, and granted the white minority full authority and sovereignty. Clearly this would not go 
unnoticed. The development of an anti-apartheid movement brought with it a campaign of 
boycotts, divestment, and sanctions, which were used to attack the political, economic, and social 
structures of South African society and the apartheid regime of South Africa collapsed as a direct 
result of these pressures. Such methods of activism relied heavily on the large audience against 
apartheid to gain support and to have a real effect on the South African government. Without 
these anti-apartheid grassroots and international organizations, the impact would have been 
nowhere near as large, and the result may have only been a reformation of policies without true 
equality. 
Was the Anti-Apartheid Movement a Human Rights Movement? 
 There is no doubt that the anti-apartheid movement was a major contributor in the fall of 
South African apartheid, but does this make it a human rights movement? The Oxford Dictionary 
defines a human rights movement quite simply as “a broad movement campaigning against the 
violation of human rights.”1 To apply this to the anti-apartheid movement: Spanning across 
many nations, the anti-apartheid movement was a broad movement that fought for the 
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 denied freedom and equality, as defined under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
of non-white South Africans. 
 Apartheid was an incredibly discriminatory policy that denied individuals their most 
basic rights because of their race. It initially claimed to be built on a policy of “separate but 
equal” but in reality enforced a policy of “worst and minimal.”2 The conditions for non-whites 
were terrible, and inequality was evident in a number of different aspects of society. Apartheid 
culture restricted access to education and opportunities to ensure a large low-paid labour force 
for white industry. It placed 86.3% of the country’s territory in the hands of the white minority 
and reserved merely 13.7% for six times as many non-whites.3 It served to be “amongst the most 
highly institutionalized and legalized system of segregation known to modern man.”4  
 Boycotts, divestment, and sanctions acted as the tools necessary for the anti-apartheid 
organizations to successfully dismantle the regime. These policies forced the South African 
government into granting equal human rights for all people within its territory. This campaign 
also did not adopt any specific political formula or enforce any political ideology; instead it 
focused on international law and human rights.5 In this sense, it maintained its objective of 
creating equality and fighting for the acknowledgement of universal human rights. Thus, 
apartheid was clearly a violation of human rights, making the anti-apartheid movement a human 
rights movement. 
The Development of the Anti-Apartheid Movement 
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  In its early phases, the anti-apartheid movement was very disorganized and disconnected. 
It was more of an assortment of social and human rights organizations than an actual human 
rights movement. As it developed, the anti-apartheid movement overcame its internal divisions, 
became more professional in its organization and universal in its policies, and transformed into 
more of a rights-based movement. It encountered many challenges throughout the years, 
especially with the neoliberal policy of ‘constructive engagement’ as put forward by Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, but persevered. In becoming more developed and organized, the 
movement was able to more effectively lobby government and corporations, as well as gain mass 
support for the effective role of boycotts, divestment, and sanctions. 
 One of the first major internal struggles that the movement faced was the issue of violent 
and non-violent resistance. The African National Congress (ANC) was initially an advocate for 
violent resistance to overthrow apartheid from within South Africa. The ANC had been working 
at training thousands of South African exiles “to carry out sabotage missions and incite unrest 
aimed at rendering the townships ungovernable.”6 This went against the concept of non-violent 
resistance that many other organizations were working towards. Non-violent resistance used 
“boycotts, sit-ins, occupations, demonstrations, refusal to pay taxes, creation of alternative and 
parallel institutions, and other forms of civil disobedience” to try and peacefully remove 
apartheid.7 The major issue was that the violent resistance used by the ANC and other groups 
undermined non-violent resistance as “the government linked the two organizations and used this 
propaganda to justify their increased repression.”8 It would eventually be non-violent resistance 
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 through boycotts, divestment, and sanctions that proved to be the most effective in dismantling 
apartheid, however. 
 Another challenge that the movement had to overcome was its initial disorganization. 
The heavily decentralized and segmented nature of the developing movement resulted in the 
absence of a leader. For this reason the movement developed slowly.9 Even Canadian efforts 
experienced this issue of broad disorganization as they never really assumed the same form of 
centralization that the UK and the US experienced.10 As apartheid was making successes and 
achieving victories, the movement that had come together was already beginning to wither away. 
It was almost forgotten before apartheid had even formally been removed. 11  Organizations 
elsewhere did not all suffer the same fate but instead developed over time and became more 
effective at using their tactics. 
 Professionalization started to occur more as the movement became organized in the 
1960s. One of the first individuals to give the movement authority in government was Michigan 
representative Charles C. Diggs. In 1969, Diggs became Chair of the House Subcommittee on 
Africa.12 At the same time, President Richard Nixon was increasing trade with South Africa and 
trying to build a better relationship with the white government there as well as in Angola, 
Mozambique, and Rhodesia. For instance, Nixon was selling aircrafts and other goods that had 
been “prohibited under the terms of the United Nations arms embargo.”13 Diggs led hearings in 
the House regarding “UN sanctions against Rhodesia, U.S. business involvement in South 
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 Africa, and political repression in both states.”14 His position in the House provided a platform 
for scholars and activists as well as representatives of anti-apartheid organizations to be heard. It 
created a political discourse and debated the Nixon administration on a number of different 
issues, becoming “a vehicle for conveying the Africanist concerns of black Americans.”15 Diggs 
essentially acted as an authority in the American House of Representatives, helping to spread the 
word of anti-apartheid groups and bring the movement together in America. 
 A significant organization that exerted professionalism and formal organization in the 
movement was TransAfrica. This organization came together in 1977 as interest in foreign 
affairs increased among black Americans. It quickly established itself as “one of the most vocal 
and consistent critics of apartheid.”16 Its leadership was made up of professional activists with 
years of experience through earlier attempts at creating a permanent Afro-American foreign 
policy organization.17 The Congressional Black Caucus was also a major supporter of the anti-
apartheid movement, and a supporter of TransAfrica. By 1985, a number of its members had 
been promoted to leadership positions on powerful committees, thereby increasing congressional 
support for the movement across a number of different committees. 18  Through its newly 
established connections in governing bodies, the anti-apartheid movement was becoming more 
present in the world of international politics, and had a larger stage to launch its campaign from. 
 The transition to universal human rights and the shift to rights-based activism can be seen 
through the example of the British labour movement and solidarity. The British Anti-Apartheid 
Movement (AAM) worked with trade unionists to convince them of the need for disengagement. 
Using few resources, it was able to hold conferences for grassroots trade unionists and “engaged 
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 with the growing shop stewards movement and made contacts in companies that supplied 
military and other sensitive material to South Africa.”19 It made its appeal for trade union support 
on the grounds that both British and South African workers shared an interest in demanding 
higher wages. They were to be united in a fight against multinational companies with British 
workers demanding more capital investment in Britain.20 This appeal essentially worked on the 
principle of reframing the argument; no longer was this to be a movement for selective human 
rights, but universal human rights. The AAM extended the concept of human rights beyond 
South Africa and framed them to be for the benefit of the British working-class as well. 
 Clearly, over time, the movement was becoming more concise and more powerful in its 
activism against the apartheid regime of South Africa. With this cohesion, its impact soon began 
to peak. After 1979, “the emphasis of the opposition movement shifted from ideological 
realignment and unity to action.”21 Boycotts, divestment, and sanctions were in full force and 
receiving widespread support. Organizations were working together, and the anti-apartheid 
movement was truly established as a human rights movement. The transition from uncoordinated 
and more individual activism to organized and collective action was proving to be crucial in the 
fight against apartheid.22 States and local governments, as well as colleges and universities, and 
corporations were reassessing their ties to apartheid as a result of the growing grassroots 
activism.23 Thus, professionalization and formal organization led to a more focused movement 
against the apartheid regime in South Africa. This newfound support of the movement also 
contributed to an increased support from other institutions that served to further strengthen it. 
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  The anti-apartheid movement was, of course, not without its challenges. This was 
especially the case during the presidency of Ronald Reagan and the leadership of Margaret 
Thatcher. While the movement was gaining a large amount of support through the 1970s, it was 
immediately challenged by the neoliberal concept of ‘constructive engagement.’ This method of 
diplomacy would allow Thatcher and Reagan to attempt to improve relations with South Africa 
and reject the sanctions that were being used against it. For Thatcher it was “embracing the 
ideological mantra ‘free economy and the strong state.’”24 For Reagan it was also very much the 
same. 25  Through the guise of economic policies that would apparently help South Africa, 
Thatcher and Reagan were able to engage in an act of self-interest while supposedly supporting 
human rights.26  
 Although constructive engagement was more of “a convenient cover for business and 
governments,” it was also quite willingly embraced by groups “genuinely opposed to apartheid 
[that] feared the implications of rapid disengagement.” 27  The origins of these fears can 
undoubtedly be found in the rhetoric of the Cold War. Around the time of ‘constructive 
engagement,’ the governments of Angola and Mozambique had fallen to Marxist revolutionaries 
while Zimbabwe was undergoing a threat of revolution.28 There was a fear that heavy sanctions 
would push South Africa into a left-wing revolution, and that the best method of preventing a 
communist political struggle would be to increase diplomatic and economic relations. This 
caused a genuine dilemma for the movement. While ‘constructive engagement’ manipulated 
some forms of anti-apartheid activism, it was still advocated by a number of individuals and 
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 organizations devoted to ending apartheid.29 A new divide erupted and briefly slowed the anti-
apartheid movement. This was however, a short-lived defeat. 
 There was eventually a distancing from Reagan and ‘constructive engagement’ in 
America. In December of 1984, twenty-five conservative Republican House members went 
against the Reagan administration as they wrote a letter to the South African ambassador that 
threatened his government with sanctions until apartheid was dismantled.30 This proved an end 
of support for ‘constructive engagement.’ In 1986, Congress also overruled Reagan’s veto of the 
Anti-Apartheid Act, which put forward the: 
 “prohibition of the importation for South African coal, steel, textiles, uranium, 
agricultural products, and products produced by South African parastatals; application of 
these sanctions to South African-controlled Namibia; prohibition of the landing of South 
African airlines in the U.S. and of the American airlines in South Africa; prevention of 
the U.S. corporations from deducting South African taxes from their income; prohibition 
of new corporate investments in governmental agencies.”31  
 
Finally, the anti-apartheid movement had overcome the challenge of ‘constructive engagement’ 
and the implementation of sanctions had returned. Although Reagan had attempted to keep the 
anti-apartheid movement out of Congress, he was unsuccessful and its influence came back to 
the forefront of pressuring South Africa into dismantling apartheid. 
 After this achievement, the anti-apartheid movement went through a progressive series of 
developments in order to increase support and influence in the dismantling of apartheid in South 
Africa. The movement began much disorganized but came together under professionals. Its 
policies became more universal, extending the movement to reach a larger audience and 
increasing its support. Growth of support was exponential, providing a larger audience in favour 
of boycotts, divestment, and sanctions and in turn increasing their effectiveness. 
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 Boycotts, Divestment, and Sanctions 
 Boycotts, divestment, and sanctions were some of the major tools used by the anti-
apartheid movement against apartheid South Africa. The initiatives began fairly early in the 
movement. Starting in the 1950s as apartheid was coming to fruition, they were carried through 
to the early 1990s as apartheid was ending.32 They clearly operated as rights-based initiatives 
that forced compliance with international law in order to ensure the respect of basic human rights 
for the non-white South African population.33 The tools grew in size and in strength as the years 
went on, highlighting the inequality that non-white South Africans were suffering as well as the 
human rights abuses that existed under apartheid. 
 Boycotts were widespread and easy for individuals to get involved in.34 A very influential 
form of boycott was the sports boycott. Sports boycotts kept South Africa out of the Olympic 
games and tarnished their international rugby and cricket teams, causing upsets within the state 
and a great deal of embarrassment. They were used as a means of “exposing injustices while 
simultaneously exerting economic pressure as leverage in the struggle for freedom, equality, and 
an end to colonialism.”35 In extending past the government and into institutions and events, 
boycotts were an effective method of influencing the government and its policies. 
 Sports boycotts were indeed some of the most effective boycotts implemented in the anti-
apartheid movement. In apartheid South Africa, sports were generally reserved for whites, 
especially at the international level. This was a policy that also would be applied to visiting 
international teams.36 In applying apartheid policies to international teams that were visiting, 
South Africa had essentially imposed its racist policies across international borders. By 
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 extension, in accepting invitations from, or in inviting all-white South African teams to visit 
would be either accepting or welcoming the policies of apartheid. This eventually became a very 
controversial issue that provided an argument for the use of sports boycotts. The largest and most 
damaging sports boycott campaigns were the Stop-the-Seventy-Tour, and the Olympic boycott. 
 The Stop-the-Seventy-Tour is arguably one of the most successful mass-action anti-
apartheid protests in British history. Its efforts led to the cancellation of the 1970 England-South 
Africa Springbok cricket series.37 The origins of this particular campaign come from the nation-
wide protests and demonstrations in Britain and Ireland when the all-white South African rugby 
team conducted a tour in 1969. At each event protestors would clash with police in their attempts 
to boycott the games. An estimated 50,000 people took part in the demonstrations.38 There was 
also an ultimatum being put forward as a majority of countries within the Commonwealth were 
threatening to boycott the Commonwealth Games if the Springbok cricket tour went on. This 
forced the British government to cancel the tour for fear of further embarrassment. 39  The 
cancellation of the tour proved that apartheid policies in international sporting events would no 
longer be tolerated. 
 The second major sports boycott campaign was the Olympic campaign. Within South 
Africa, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) was formed in 1962. 
The committee’s main objective was the removal of apartheid policies in sport and the 
introduction of non-white South African athletes in the Olympics.40 At around the same time, the 
AAM was also working towards the elimination of apartheid sport in the Olympics.41 Similar to 
the statements made earlier, the participation of an all-white South African team representing 
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 apartheid principles on an international stage could be extended to the welcoming of human 
rights abuses. It took a few years to develop, but as a result of boycott campaigns South Africa 
was officially banned from the Olympics on May 15, 1970. The impact on apartheid was not as 
effective as it was hoped to be, however. In South Africa, the dominant sports are rugby and 
cricket and neither of which would have been present in the Olympics.42 As such, unlike the 
cancellation of the Springbok Cricket Tour, South Africa’s exclusion from the Olympics had a 
smaller effect.  
 Regardless, by 1984 Pretoria had implemented desegregation of its sports teams in an 
effort to gain readmission to the Olympics. This brought with it a number of pickets of the Los 
Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC), the South African Embassy, and the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC).43 Although this attempt at desegregation may have only 
been the appearance of reforming apartheid with no real substance to it, it does show that South 
Africa acknowledges apartheid as internationally unacceptable. It also shows the impact that the 
campaign was starting to bring as South Africa’s embarrassment was building. 
 Boycotts in these instances ultimately show accessibility for individuals to take part in 
this method of protest, as well as their potential for lasting effects. Embarrassment on the 
international level contributed a social impact that alone was not substantial, but in combination 
with divestment and sanctions had much more potential to deter apartheid policies. 
 Divestment was also a very useful tool during the anti-apartheid movement and 
contributed a large economic and political impact. It has been criticized for its tremendous 
effects on economies; this of course is to be expected for a powerful form of protest.44 It targeted 
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 corporations seen as complicit in the violation of human rights. Essentially the opposite of 
investing, divestment is the reallocating of investments, in this case their withdrawal from 
corporations operating within or profiting from apartheid South Africa. This tactic was most 
effective in inspiring the end to apartheid when large corporations would withdraw or refuse to 
invest.45 Its implementation had a direct effect on the economy of South Africa and reduced the 
amount of foreign investment. It was also a representative from of political pressure, directly 
affecting the economy and simultaneously bypassing the nation-state.46 Quoting from Håkan 
Thörn, Meg Voorhes has put forward that there are several functions of divestment: “it ‘directly 
influenced corporate policy, reinforced grassroots anti-apartheid mobilization, and contributed to 
the dramatic public shift in favour of sanctions against South Africa.’” 47  The ability of 
divestment to infiltrate the South African economy and directly influence the apartheid regime 
made it an extremely effective tool in the anti-apartheid movement.  
 Sanctions were also implemented through the efforts of the anti-apartheid movement. 
They are said to be the hardest initiatives to implement but those with the highest degree of 
efficiency. 48  Sanctions were created through the lobbying of governments and larger 
international corporations in an attempt to upset the status quo and pressure South Africa into 
ending apartheid.49 They illustrate the power of a nation state being used as an instrument in 
pressuring South Africa.50 An example of this power would be the AAM’s ability to lobby the 
Labour government. From 1970-1974, sanctions were very difficult to lobby for in the House as 
they were shut down by the Conservative government that was in power at the time. It was after 
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 1974 and with the victory of the Labour Party that sanctions became more successful, resulting 
in the compliance with the UN arms embargo. 51  Sanctions were almost always vetoed by 
Western powers of the Security Council when they were proposed to the UN. This changed in 
the mid-1980s, where between 1985 and 1987, “Britain, France, Spain, Panama, Portugal, and 
the United States introduced economic sanctions.”52 Sanctions thus became a much larger part of 
the anti-apartheid movement after a view of its first successes in divestment and through 
boycotts. They were undoubtedly a reflection of the growing support for the anti-apartheid 
movement. 
The Impact of Boycotts, Divestment, and Sanctions 
 The campaign of boycotts, divestment, and sanctions had a very large impact on the 
apartheid regime of South Africa. For example, the Nationalist parties in South Africa suffered 
greatly as a result of discontent among the white population of the country. There were many 
connections to apartheid, international sanctions, and the economic well-being of the population. 
The result was a drop in support for the Nationalist parties from 68% in 1984 to 56% in 1989.53 
This time frame is significant as it was a considerable turning point in the anti-apartheid 
movement. As we have seen, between 1984 and 1989 the policies of ‘constructive engagement’ 
fell apart, providing a return to more isolating forms of protest against South Africa. The 
implementations of sanctions from powerful nations increased during this time. America 
implemented the Anti-Apartheid Act; and South Africa was again denied admittance into the 
Olympics. This brings out the true strength of the boycotts, divestment, and sanctions campaigns: 
their ability to suggest horizontal processes “whereby grassroots organizations can choose their 
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 target, tactics, and strategy according to the specificities of their individual contexts and, 
therefore, contribute in myriad ways.”54 These policies, in combination with each other and the 
strength of the anti-apartheid movement, ultimately led to the dismantling of apartheid in South 
Africa. 
 The impact of divestment was incredibly substantial. It is said that divestment was the 
most powerful means of deterring apartheid policies in South Africa. This can be attributed 
greatly to its ability to directly affect the economy and indirectly affect government policy. The 
impact of divestment is quite easy to see. In 1970, direct investment constituted 68% of total 
foreign investment, but after fourteen years of divestment promotion through the anti-apartheid 
movement, direct investment had dropped to 39% in 1984. 55  Likewise, the amount of US 
investment dropped from $2.8 billion in 1983 to $1.3 billion in 1985, with 350 US companies 
having fully pulled out of South Africa by 1987.56 In just over a decade divestment was able to 
cripple foreign investment into South Africa and have an enormous effect on its economy. 
 Sanctions were seen as the most widespread initiative however, and their impact was 
much more predictable. They had a large impact on foreign capital inflows and resulted in a 
small number of exports for South Africa.57 The most lasting impact that sanctions would have 
however, was in the way that they forced South Africa to become more self-sufficient and 
dependent on its labour force, opening higher positions for non-whites – though still not granting 
them their universal human rights.58 Sanctions, much like divestment, affected the economy of 
South Africa and contributed in upsetting the status quo in such a way that South Africa was 
forced to abandon its policy of apartheid. 
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  Boycotts may have been a form of activism that was easier to implement on a variety of 
different scales, but it provided a very extensive impact on apartheid in South Africa. The very 
threat of boycotts of South Africa in the 1984 Olympics pushed the leader of the IOC to go 
against the Olympic Charter and keep South Africa out of the Olympics – making the decision as 
early as 1981.59 This showed the power the boycotts had built up, and the authority they carried. 
The boycotts were seen as being so effective that even the IOC would not be able to withstand 
their financial and diplomatic fall-out. 60  South Africa would finally rejoin the Olympic 
community in Barcelona in 1992, “following the commencement of governmental talks to finally 
bring an end to apartheid.”61 
 Ultimately, the campaigns of boycotts, divestment, and sanctions proved to be the most 
effective tools accessible to the anti-apartheid movement; allowing it to accomplish its goal of 
ending apartheid in South Africa.  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the collapse of the apartheid system of governing in South Africa was the 
direct result of a campaign of boycotts, divestment, and sanctions instituted through the anti-
apartheid movement. Without the collective action of countless organizations within the 
movement, this campaign would not have been as effective. The impact and the success in 
dismantling apartheid came from the development of the anti-apartheid movement and the 
growth in support it created for itself. Through boycotts, divestment, and sanctions, the anti-
apartheid movement was able to infiltrate South Africa socially, economically, and politically, 
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 ending the human rights abusing apartheid regime and ensuring freedom and human rights for 
the non-white population. 
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